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GENDERED INTRA-HOUSEHOLD
DECISION-MAKING DYNAMICS IN
AGRICULTURAL INNOVATION PROCESSES:
ASSETS, NORMS AND BARGAINING
POWER
RIEKO SHIBATA* , SARAH CARDEY and PETER DORWARD
School of Agriculture, Policy and Development, University of Reading, Reading, UK
Abstract: This article explores intra-household decision-making in smallholder farmers’ innovation
uptake and use of outputs within a bargaining framework. Research was conducted in selected
locations representing contrasting economic, social and agroclimatic environments in Uganda using
a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods (including a survey of 531 farmers).
Decision-making in innovation processes was highly gendered and shaped by intra-household
allocation of production assets as well as social norms. The findings highlight the male capture of
decision-making regarding innovation uptake and use of outputs, especially for income-generating
crops, and that this can both reflect and reinforce gender inequalities in asset ownership. © 2020
The Authors. Journal of International Development published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd
Keywords: Intra-household dynamics; decision-making; gender; bargaining; agricultural
innovations; smallholder farmers
1 INTRODUCTION
Innovations are increasingly important for tackling development challenges, including
poverty, food and nutrition insecurity, climate change, degraded natural resources and
population pressure on scarce lands (Spielman, Ekboir & Davis, 2009; Wiggins, 2014;
World Bank, 2007a, 2012). Nevertheless, the fact that innovation processes and outputs
are highly gendered is often neglected in Agricultural Innovation System literature and
innovation support interventions, resulting in a low uptake of innovations (Cardey &
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Garforth, 2013; Kingiri, 2013; Pyburn, 2014; Reij, Waters-Bayer & Tripp, 2001).
Moreover, linear ‘transfer of technology’ perspectives and simplistic innovation studies
prevent a profound understanding of innovation as collective and negotiated processes
which involve the reordering of social relationships (Leeuwis & Aarts, 2011).
Men and women introduce innovations and benefit from them differently. ‘Traditionally’
defined gendered divisions of labour is a key factor that shapes the characteristics of
innovations that farmers adopt. Women are more likely to be engaged in subsistence
farming, while men are more likely to be involved with cash crops (Moser, 2012). This
explains the higher uptake rate for food crop-related changes for women, while more
men prefer cash crop-related changes, as highlighted in a range of case studies in
innovation and extension literature (Mazur & Onzere, 2009; Miiro, Chritchley, Van Der
Wal & Lwakuba, 2001; World Bank, 2007b).
Gender differences in innovation uptake are attributed to the unequal access to resources,
which result from gendered roles and responsibilities. The Future Agricultures Consortium
found that those households with more land, assets and resources took advantage of
agricultural opportunities, often leaving out female farmers with fewer resources
(Wiggins, 2014). Further empirical evidence suggests that women are more likely to be
engaged in subsistence farming and less likely to cultivate cash crops because of gender
inequality in terms of limited access to fertile soil, tenured security of plots and credit (Doss
& Morris, 2001; Fisher & Carr, 2015; Mazur & Onzere, 2009; World Bank, 2007b).
This study investigates how such gender inequalities are embedded in local innovation
processes at farmer level in Uganda, focusing particularly on intra-household decisions.
Uganda ranks 14th highest in the world for the rate of its male and female population
employed in agriculture (70.4 per cent of total employment; 65.5 per cent of male
employment; and 75.8 per cent of female employment) in 2016, according to ILOSTAT.
As the majority of farmers (96.3 per cent) are engaged in subsistence farming
(UBOS, 2014), the sector holds great importance for poverty alleviation. However, it is
reported that women’s agricultural productivity is lower than men’s by some margin, as
a result of gender inequalities in access to the factors of production (MAAIF, 2016; World
Bank, 2016).
1.1 Intra-Household Decision-Making and Bargaining Power in Innovation
Processes
Innovation is a process which constitutes a series of intra-household decisions which are
strongly affected by existing decision-making patterns on production and consumption
and perceived institutions, such as social norms and culture. Earlier studies of ‘New Home
Economics’, founded by Becker (1965), applied a unitary model which assumes that a
household is a single production or consumption unit, thus failing to understand
intra-household dynamics (Agarwal, 1997; Moghadam et al., 2011; Wolf, 1990). However,
the bargaining framework emerged to claim that the outcomes of households’ decisions are
affected by the allocation of resources and the power relationship within the household, as
opposed to the unitary model’s predictions of a single consumption unit (Anderson,
Reynolds & Gugerty, 2017; Browning, Chiappori & Lechene, 2010; Doss, 2001;
Doss, 2013; Meinzen-Dick et al., 2011).
Agarwal (1997) and Doss (2013) further categorise the bargaining framework into
cooperative bargaining models, collective models and non-cooperative bargaining models,
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whereby the former two presume the Pareto efficiency in household outcome in which no
one could be better off without making someone else worse off, while the latter models
reject this. The cooperative bargaining and collective models argue that individual
household members bargain over how to allocate both pooled resources and household
expenditure; hence, there are different outcomes because of different preferences among
household individuals. Non-cooperative bargaining models assume that individuals in
households make separate decisions about their own resources, that is, resources are not
pooled but rather spent individually (Doss, 2001). However, Malapit (2012) claims that
cooperative models and non-cooperative models are not mutually exclusive. Much of the
literature in the area supports non-cooperative models or a combination of the three
models, as the best explanation of intra-household decision-making in developing country
contexts (Browning, Chiappori & Lechene, 2010; Kebede, Tarazona, Munro &
Verschoor, 2014; Mcpeak & Doss, 2006; Njuki, Kaaria, Chamunorwa & Chiuri, 2011;
Udry, 1996). This could be true in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) where resources are not often
pooled but are typically controlled by men (Njuki, Kaaria, Chamunorwa & Chiuri, 2011).
In SSA, decisions about gender roles and responsibilities are seemingly governed by strong
social norms or institutions, not necessarily with the aim of maximising household
productivity, with daily negotiations among household individuals. In other words, in
any model, gender inequalities in decision-making authorities are apparent; in cooperative
and collective bargaining models, production and consumption decisions are affected by
gender inequalities in bargaining power which are often led by unequal asset endowment
and control. In parallel, in non-cooperative bargaining models, gender inequalities in asset
endowment limit the share of decisions, which come under women’s control.
Intra-household bargaining or dynamics influences the uptake of new agricultural
technologies, but it is seldom examined by innovation and adoption studies literature. Many
empirical studies reveal that women farmers have relatively low rates of adoption of
agricultural technologies associated with higher productivity. However, these studies do
not consider the intra-household context and the bargaining framework, which may affect
the technology adoption (Doss, 2001; Doss, 2013; Haider, Smale & Theriault, 2018). Some
of the first contributions to the analysis of technology adoption in intra-household contexts
were those of Von Braun (1988) and Jones (1983) who investigated how the allocation of
labour changed when irrigated rice was introduced in West Africa. Those studies
demonstrate that women’s insufficient bargaining power allows benefits of the new
technologies to be captured by men, as predicted earlier by Boserup (1970). More recently,
Fisher and Carr (2015), in their adoption study on drought-tolerant maize in eastern Uganda,
found that women farmers have much lower adoption rates of drought-tolerant maize
compared with men farmers because of differences in resource access. Moreover, Haider,
Smale and Theriault (2018) analysed fertiliser adoption in Burkina Faso and demonstrated
that technology adoption status differs among household members depending on whether
their plots are collectively or individually managed. Thus, based on gender and sociocultural
dynamics relating to resources and labour (re)allocations associated with innovation, it is
clear that intra-household bargaining influences adoption. It is also noteworthy that the
gendered division of labour by crop and by task is not static; rather, it changes in accordance
with new economic opportunities (Doss, 2001). This implies that change in the economic
value of a certain crop may change gender power relations in intra-household resource
allocation and in who benefits from the crop.
There is again scarce literature on the intra-household decision-making which concerns
the output of innovations. Women and men in SSA may not pool household incomes, but
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they may negotiate and choose to spend the money they control differently from one
another (Doss, 2013; Meinzen-Dick et al., 2011; Njuki, Kaaria, Chamunorwa &
Chiuri, 2011). Some studies have shown that women’s bargaining power affects the
household budget share spent on food, education, health, private goods or other goods.
However, the practical difficulty of distinguishing between goods for the entire family
and those purchased purely for individual members makes it difficult to assess the
bargaining power of household individuals. Doss (2013) also suggests that consumption
patterns may be strongly related to measures of bargaining powers, particularly income
and asset ownership.
As determinants of bargaining power, a range of studies identify factors including
income and employment, ownership and control over assets, such as land, livestock and
agricultural equipment, social networks and access to credit (Doss, 2013; Meinzen-Dick
et al., 2011; Mishra & Sam, 2016). Additional determinants identified are women’s
education, age, health and their participation in the market (Anderson, Reynolds &
Gugerty, 2017), as well as the strength of the person’s fall-back position, which is the
outside option if cooperation failed (Agarwal, 1997). The ownership and types of such
assets are gendered, conditioned and perpetuated by sociocultural context and
intra-household allocation rules (Doss, Meinzen-Dick, Quisumbing & Theis, 2018;
Johnson et al., 2016; Quisumbing et al., 2015). Those studies which investigate
determinants of bargaining power can provide significant insights for understanding
decision-making patterns in innovation contexts.
Thus, many studies suggest that innovations are influenced by gendered resource
allocations, such as land, labour, credit, agricultural inputs and extension, as well as gender
norms. However, few studies have attempted to reveal such influence in an intra-household
context. Moreover, many adoption studies typically focus only on a specific crop or
technology, thereby failing to capture holistic views of innovation processes or of farmers’
subjective reasoning behind their decision-making patterns (Leeuwis, 2004). Therefore,
taking an intra-household bargaining perspective, this article aims to analyse how men
and women farmers within the household make decisions about their agricultural
innovations and what determines the decision-making authority over the innovation
processes. The study was guided by the following research questions:
• How do men and women within the same households make decisions regarding the
uptake of innovations and the use of products from them?
• What influences decision-making authority by men and women within the household?
2 METHODS
The study was conducted in Uganda between November 2016 and February 2018 and
applied an exploratory and inductive approach. In order to examine a wide range of
innovation process scenarios, two villages, the most advantaged and most disadvantaged
in terms of enabling environment for innovations,1 were chosen for each of two
agroecological zones (AEZs) in Uganda, namely, North Western Savannah Grasslands
(NWSG) and South Western Farmlands (SWF). Thus, four villages in total were
1The indicator of Enabling Environment for Innovations (EEI) was created by the author, based on a set of criteria
purposively chosen from the readily available data from the Agriculture Census 2008/9 (UBOS, 2010) and
interviews with the local government production department.
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focused on (see Figure 1). World Bank (2012) defines ‘innovation’ as ‘the process by
which individuals or organizations master and implement the design and production
of goods and services that are new to them, irrespective of whether they are new to
their competitors, their country or the world’. On the other hand, an innovation here
is defined as a new change that is made to farming activities or practices by a
household member(s) (Leeuwis, 2004; Nielsen, 2001). It may not be new to the area
or location but is to that particular individual (Hall, Mytelka & Oyelaran-
Oyeyinka, 2006; World Bank, 2012). In this study, an innovation was identified by
farmers themselves, not by researchers, as a new practice which they think actually
worked for them.
The field research process is summarised in Table 1. For ‘Wealth Ranking’ pioneered by
Grandin (1988) and widely used by both academia and practitioners (Hargreaves
et al., 2007), all the farming households in each village were categorised into three wealth
groups—poor, moderate and rich—based on the wealth factors identified by key
informants, commonly the combination of land size and use, livestock type and number,
livelihood type, housing type, food security status and so on. Furthermore, Focus Group
Discussions were organised for various gender and wealth categories of farmers; this
provided the basis on which structured questionnaires were formulated. Regarding the
household and individual surveys, all the household heads and their spouses (if any)
available during the survey period were interviewed face-to-face, using a structured
questionnaire, whereby the enumerators input the data using smartphones with Open Data
Kit. The individual farmers were interviewed about their experiences of key innovations
(up to maximum three) introduced in the last 10 years (2008–2017). Specifically, the
respondents were asked who the first person was to know about innovations within the
household and who decided to introduce the key innovations. Table 2 shows the number
Figure 1. Research sites in agricultural production zones of Uganda. Source: MAAIF (2016)
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of respondents and innovation cases collected in total. During the visit to each household,
either the household head or the spouse was interviewed (based on alternating selection)
and asked about household characteristics, their three main crops and their main livestock.
In this way, data were generated on the gender role divisions for each farming activity and
the control of profits and outputs from each enterprise.
In-depth interviews were conducted with farmers randomly selected from each stratified
category of gender and wealth; questions asked covered whether the respondent must seek
permission from his or her partner to introduce innovations and give reasons for its
implementation; if there are any enterprises or activities that the respondent is allowed to
do without permission from his or her partner; and who controls the profit from
innovations. All interviews were audio recorded and transcribed for content analysis.
Moreover, regarding the most frequently mentioned innovations, usually two to three per
village, 84 farmers randomly selected from the stratified categories of farmers who
responded that they had introduced the selected innovations were selected for two
participatory activities, namely, participatory budgeting and an effects diagram. The former
activity investigated cash and in-kind inputs and outputs, comparing gross margins with
and without innovations. During the latter activity, the farmers were asked about
intra-household decision-making on innovation outputs in terms of expenditure of
innovation profits, that is, what the benefits (specific amounts of cash or food produce
gained from the innovation) were used for, who made the decisions about their use and
what the knock-on effects of their use were.
Table 1. Research process
Data collection tools Sessions Female Male Total
Livelihood/farm system mapping
(changes between present & 20 years ago)
8 24 24 48
Wealth ranking 4 12 12 24
FGDs 49 94 72 166
Household questionnaire survey 358 207 151 358
Individual questionnaire survey 531 312 219 531
In-depth individual interviews 90 56 34 90
Participatory budgeting and effects diagrams 83 44 39 83
Table 2. Number of questionnaire respondents and innovations introduceda
Gender
category
Poor Moderate Rich Total
Farmer Innov. Farmer Innov. Farmer Innov. Farmer Innov.
Single men 18 23 12 13 1 0 31 36
Married men 58 108 104 178 25 44 187 330
Single women 39 64 48 73 2 5 89 142
Married women 72 123 124 182 28 40 224 345
Total 187 318 288 446 56 89 531 853
aRespondents were divided into four categories: single men; married men; single women; and married women.
‘Married’ signifies ‘with partner/s’ rather than official marital status, while ‘single’ means either widowed,
separated or divorced.
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3 RESULTS
This section shows the main innovations which were reported to have been introduced over
the previous 10 years, and who within the households decided to introduce those
innovations. These innovation overviews are followed by the perceived reasons behind
the gendered decision-making patterns on both uptake and use of outputs. Furthermore,
farmers’ perceptions were used to guide the study in to generate empirical evidence
regarding relationships between decision-making patterns and the identified factors such
as gendered enterprises and assets.
3.1 Innovation Overview
Importantly, there are statistically significant differences between men and women in terms
of innovation types (x2 = 23.833, d.f. = 14, p = 0.048) (Table 3). For example, the
Table 3. Innovation types by gender
Innovation types
Married men
Married
women Total
Count % Count % Count %
Crop* Soil management* 63 19.1% 49 14.2% 112 16.6%
New crop 48 14.5% 66 19.1% 114 16.9%
Land preparation and planting
method
38 11.5% 52 15.1% 90 13.3%
Expansion in area planted 33 10.0% 33 9.6% 66 9.8%
New variety 30 9.1% 42 12.2% 72 10.7%
Managerial practices (pruning,
de-suckering, staking)
25 7.6% 19 5.5% 44 6.5%
Pest and disease control* 14 4.2% 25 7.2% 39 5.8%
Improved farming tools 13 3.9% 5 1.4% 18 2.7%
Change in planting timing 8 2.4% 4 1.2% 12 1.8%
Weeding method 3 0.9% 8 2.3% 11 1.6%
Harvesting/post-harvesting
method (storage, processing,
marketing)
2 0.6% 2 0.6% 4 0.6%
Irrigation/water harvesting 2 0.6% 2 0.6% 4 0.6%
Reduction in area planted 1 0.3% 3 0.9% 4 0.6%
Other 1 0.3% 0 0.0% 1 0.1%
Livestock* New animal 23 7.0% 16 4.6% 39 5.8%
Animal disease control 15 4.5% 13 3.8% 28 4.1%
Expansion in no. of animals 5 1.5% 6 1.7% 11 1.6%
New breed 3 0.9% 0 0.0% 3 0.4%
Reduction in no. of animals 2 0.6% 0 0.0% 2 0.3%
Other 1 0.3% 0 0.0% 1 0.1%
Total 330 100.0% 345 n.a. 675 100.0%
Respondents were asked to name up to a maximum of three innovations that they had made in the last 10 years
and that they were directly involved in.
*p < 0.1.
**p < 0.05.
***p < 0.01 (χ2-tests were run for only innovations which have more than 10 samples for both numbers of men’s
and women’s innovations.)
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proportion of livestock-related innovations is larger for men (14.8 per cent) than women
(10.1 per cent), with a statistically significant difference (x2 = 3.533, d.f. = 1, p = 0.060).
3.2 Intra-Household Decision-Making on Uptake of Innovations
The study investigated gender differences in intra-household decision-making authority for
their main innovations (Table 4). Consequently, the study found that a higher percentage of
self-decision is seen for men’s innovations (69.7 per cent), compared with that for married
women (50.7 per cent). The χ2-test found that there are statistically significant differences
between men’s and women’s innovations regarding who decided to introduce the
innovation (x2 = 53.458, d.f. = 3, p < 0.000).
Regarding wealth differences in gendered patterns of decision-making on innovation
uptake (Figure 2), stronger male dominance is seen in the wealthier households.
Innovations made by rich married women were dominated to a greater degree by their
husbands (19.5 per cent), compared with the innovations made by poor (16.3 per cent)
and moderate (13.2 per cent) married women. On the other hand, the largest proportion
of the innovations made by rich married men (83.7 per cent) tends to be decided by
themselves, compared with innovations made by poor (68.5 per cent) and moderate
(66.9 per cent) married men.
The results of the in-depth interviews provide further insights into the above-mentioned
gender patterns, which concern decision-making on innovation uptake. Husbands mostly
do not need to seek agreement from their wives, while wives must seek permission from
their husbands to introduce any new innovations. Typically, married women are only
allowed to plant vegetables and other food crops for the purpose of home consumption
without first asking permission from their husbands.
The reasons raised by men for why they make decisions without discussing them with
their wives are that men are family heads, that they are the owners of land and that the
particular crops being grown are deemed ‘men’s’ crops. Reasons related to land ownership
were more strongly pronounced among the rich men. However, poor and moderate male
farmers reported that they share innovation ideas with their wives in advance because
the work requires their wives’ efforts, especially their labour. Unlike the poor and moderate
males, rich women have no bargaining tools because rich men can hire labour and,
therefore, are not dependent on their wife’s labour to support their innovations. This
finding resonates with the results seen in Figure 2, which demonstrates that the rich men
have more decision-making authority regarding their innovations than poor and moderate
men. Furthermore, husbands indicated that their wives could possibly introduce new ideas
if the husbands are not around, as long as the wives report them later.
Table 4. Intra-household decision-making on innovation uptake
Gender
Who decided to introduce innovation?
TotalMyself Jointly Spouse Other
Married men’s innovations N 230 96 3 1 330
% 69.7% 29.1% 0.9% 0.3% 100.0%
Married women’s innovations N 175 118 52 0 345
% 50.7% 34.2% 15.1% 0.0% 100.0%
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I own land, it is mine and to open up any enterprise, no one should first authorise
me. I’m in control and I’m the manager … Of course my wife and sons have to seek
for approval (from me). (Ru8/Rich married man in disadvantaged village, SWFAEZ)
I do not need to ask permission from her, but I shared the idea with her, because she
is a concerned party. Because when I am not around, she has to take care of animals.
(Ry3/Poor married man in advantaged village, SWF AEZ)
Figure 2. Intra-household decision-making on introducing innovations by wealth.
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The reasons given by women in this study for seeking approval from men are the
following: men are their bosses and women are their subordinates; the innovations require
capital from their husbands to buy seeds and materials and to pay for casual labour; such
innovations require labour from their husbands (e.g. spraying pesticides); and that the
women do not know the boundary of their land. Some moderate-income married women
claim that they do not ask permission from their husbands because the resources, such
as land rent and seeds, are paid for by women themselves, as seen in the statement below
from a female farmer (Ru15). Women’s decision-making power for innovations appears
therefore to be stronger where land is rented by women, or jointly purchased, especially
in the land-scarce SWF AEZ compared with the land-abundant NWSG AEZ and where
large areas are customary land. Furthermore, a rich married woman (N15) expressed her
fear of divorce if she does not follow what her husband tells her to do regarding
innovations. This is consistent with results in Figure 2 and indicates that rich women’s
innovations are more strongly controlled by their husbands. Furthermore, men claim that
women should seek approval from them for reasons similar to those raised by the women
noted above.
Why seek permission? It was my own money I used to buy the Irish potatoes from
selling millet. I planted where I wanted. In case he stops me from using it, I would
go out and rent in. He does not ask permission from me either, because he is growing
his own crops. (Ru15/Moderate married woman in disadvantaged village, SWFAEZ)
If I do not follow his advice, he will divorce me. I have to ask permission from my
husband when introducing new practices. When he introduces, he will just say he
is going to do this, not necessarily getting an approval. (N15/Rich married woman
in advantaged village, NWSG AEZ)
3.3 Intra-Household Decision-Making on Innovation Outputs
In a similar way to the production process discussed previously, men maintain stronger
decision-making power over innovation outputs than women. The decisions on how to
spend cash income from innovations are typically made by husbands, while wives decide
on how much harvest is to be kept for home consumption and distributed to neighbours and
relatives, as revealed by the participatory budgeting and effects diagrams. Buying land and
animals and paying school fees are often suggested or decided by men, while buying
clothes and domestic basic necessities such as soap, salt and cooking oil are often decided
by women (Table 5). The reasons why the women in this study give part of their harvest
to their neighbours is said to be primarily in expectation of their help in return in case of
sickness and/or food shortage. This is consistent with female responsibility for domestic
food and welfare provision, although the reciprocity culture differs between NWSG and
SWF AEZs. Table 5 depicts that men have more authority over outputs for assets and
investment, where off-farm investment seems stronger than on-farm investment, and social
expenditure such as education and medical treatment, while women tend to control home
consumption and produce distribution to helpers or others.
Findings from in-depth interviews suggest that decision-making on outputs is strongly
influenced by the type of crops that are being grown, particularly whether it is a cash crop
or a food crop, as claimed by some respondents (E7 and Ru18). Men typically control
profit from men’s crops, such as banana, while women are relatively free to use the petty
R. Shibata et al.
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cash gained from selling surplus food crops, such as beans, maize, millet, groundnuts
and soybeans. However, the profit that women can use is limited to the purchase of family
necessities like soaps and salt, as described by Ru14.
She can sell and use money from vegetables at small scale, as long as she meets the
basic family needs. Yes, we always sit and budget this money together as a family.
Table 5. Intra-household decision-making on innovation outputs
Innovation Mainly musband Jointly Mainly wife
Expansion of sesame Maize, goats, chicken,
medical treatment, school
fee, in-kind contribution to
helpers, capital for
brick-laying business,
hiring ox-plough
Seeds for next season,
home consumption,
funeral donation
Home consumption, soap,
cooking oil, salt, in-kind
contribution to helpers,
clothes, seeds for
next season
Irrigation for tomato Hiring ox-plough, hiring
casual labour for maize,
school fee, cows,
motorbike,
Home consumption,
donation to neighbours,
building materials for
permanent house, land,
ox-plough, goats, hiring
casual labour for maize
None
Line-planting for
beans
Goats, home
consumption, seed
exchange, seeds for next
season, hiring casual
labour for next season,
medical treatment
Saving for permanent
house, home consumption
Home consumption,
in-kind contribution to
neighbours
Mulching/manure for
banana
School fees, uniforms,
books, land purchase, land
hire (for Irish potato,
beans, sweet potato), Irish
potato and beans seeds,
saving for emergency,
group saving for cow,
clothes, goats, pigs,
medical treatment,
treatment for cows, hiring
casual labour for banana
expansion, soap, salt,
cooking oil, home
consumption
In-kind contribution to
neighbours, pigs, soap,
salt, medication, tea
plantation, school fees,
hiring casual labour for
banana, medical
treatment, meat, clothes
business for wife,
mulches, goats, chickens
Home consumption,
in-kind contribution to
mother, pigs, uniform,
scholastic materials, food,
fish, meat, soap, salt
Introduction of Irish
potato
School fees, land
purchase, land hire, saving
for emergency, home
expenses (salt, soap),
seeds, shop items for his
business, medical
treatment, home
consumption
Seeds for next season,
school fee, uniform, land
hire, saving for
emergency, cows, hiring
casual labour, clothes,
medical treatment, saving
group, home expenses
(salt, soap), home
consumption, in-kind
payment for casual labour
Home consumption, seeds
for next season, uniform,
seed exchange with
neighbours, construction
of house
Gendered Decision-Making in Innovation
© 2020 The Authors.
Journal of International Development published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd
J. Int. Dev. (2020)
DOI: 10.1002/jid
But I have more say on money, because I am the head of the family. (E7/Moderate
married man in disadvantaged village, NWSG AEZ)
I’m only allowed to sell sweet banana, and I can use that money for my personal use,
like sanitary pads, knickers and skirts. For groundnuts and soybeans, I grow mostly
for food but the surplus I can sell and use the money for my personal purpose.
(Ru18/Rich married woman in disadvantaged village, SWG AEZ)
Man has control over the benefits (from innovation). For example, it is when
deciding to buy land, which banana to eat or sell while I’m only allowed to decide
for petty issues like buying salt and soap. (Ru14/Moderate married woman in
disadvantaged village, SWFAEZ)
Cultural beliefs and norms of gender roles and responsibilities appear to be dictating the
decision-making authority over innovation outputs, according to the in-depth interviews.
For example, women are believed to be responsible for home food provision, as outlined
in the examples above. In addition, intra-household allocation of resources, such as land,
labour and farm inputs, influence the decision-making on innovation outputs, similar to
decision-making about innovation uptake (as previously discussed). This comes from the
belief that production outputs which used men’s assets belong to men. On the contrary,
wives can decide on outputs if they use their own land, as Ru12 insists. When innovation
requires the wife’s labour participation, the profit tends to be more jointly decided, while
profit from off-farm labour is typically kept and controlled by the one who did the work
(Ry17).
It is me who decide how much to give him after selling Irish, beans, and banana. It is
me, because the plantation is on my own land. He (husband) spends his money on
waragi (local brewery). Wife is in charge of food. (Ru12/Poor married woman in
disadvantaged village, SWG AEZ)
It is me who decides (earning from sweet potato) and also I decide on the money I
earn from tea plucking. And my husband also decides on what he earns from
spraying. (Ry17/Moderate married woman in advantaged village, SWG AEZ)
3.4 Empirical Evidence of Gendered Enterprises and Decision-Making Power
As discussed above, intra-household decision-making which concerns innovation
implementation and outputs is strongly related to the type of crops and livestock which
are gendered by perceived social norms and household rules. This section verifies the
farmers’ claims on men’s and women’s crops or animals in relation to decision-making
authority and to further unpack decision-making patterns based on the different levels of
the enterprise’s contribution to household income. With regard to crops, results of the
household survey on intra-household decision-making about crop management and control
over the resultant profit (Table 6) reveals that decision-making authority differs depending
on crop type. This is consistent with findings of the in-depth interviews which disclosed
that women are relatively free to make innovations for food crops, such as sweet potatoes,
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millet, beans, maize, groundnuts and vegetables for home consumption, while they are
often not allowed to make innovations which concern men’s crops, such as banana,
tobacco and onion.
Analysis of livestock management analysis reveals greater male dominance in
decision-making regarding livestock compared with crop management (Table 7). Women
have either no or little authority to decide whether and when to sell or consume animals,
except chickens. Control over the profits from livestock similarly male dominated.
Table 7. Intra-household decision-making on management and profit control by livestock type
Who decides whether and when
to sell or consume the animals?
Which person within your household
manages the profit from this animal?
Mainly
husband
Jointly Mainly
wife
Other Mainly
husband
Jointly Mainly
wife
Other
NWSG AEZ
Pigs 60.0% 30.0% 10.0% 0.0% 75.0% 12.5% 12.5% 0.0%
Cows 53.8% 42.3% 0.0% 3.8% 53.3% 46.7% 0.0% 0.0%
Goats 51.5% 40.9% 7.6% 0.0% 50.0% 37.0% 13.0% 0.0%
Chickens 40.7% 42.6% 16.7% 0.0% 40.0% 45.0% 15.0% 0.0%
SWF AEZ
Cows 63.6% 36.4% 0.0% 0.0% 61.9% 33.3% 4.8% 0.0%
Goats 58.1% 35.5% 6.5% 0.0% 57.4% 31.1% 11.5% 0.0%
Pigs 55.6% 44.4% 0.0% 0.0% 50.0% 37.5% 12.5% 0.0%
Chickens 52.4% 28.6% 14.3% 4.8% 60.0% 22.9% 17.1% 0.0%
aOnly major crops are listed in the table. The original data contain 304 and 251 livestock cases for production
decision and output decision, respectively.
Table 6. Intra-household decision-making on management and profit control by crop type
Who decides to grow and how
to grow the crop?
Which person within your household
manages the profit from this crop?
Mainly
husband
Jointly Mainly
wife
Mainly
husband
Jointly Mainly
wife
NWSG AEZ
Beans 36.2% 36.2% 27.7% 37.8% 35.6% 26.7%
Cassava 35.5% 50.0% 14.5% 39.7% 35.6% 24.7%
Maize 34.0% 50.9% 15.1% 44.2% 30.2% 25.6%
Groundnuts 27.6% 52.9% 19.5% 35.7% 44.0% 20.2%
Sesame 24.3% 67.6% 8.1% 31.4% 54.3% 14.3%
SWF AEZ
Coffee 66.7% 33.3% 0.0% 16.7% 66.7% 16.7%
Banana 58.7% 35.9% 5.4% 49.3% 42.0% 8.7%
Tea 57.1% 42.9% 0.0% 42.9% 57.1% 0.0%
Irish potato 54.8% 32.3% 12.9% 60.0% 30.0% 10.0%
Maize 46.3% 42.6% 11.1% 53.2% 40.4% 6.4%
Cassava 33.3% 28.6% 38.1% 41.7% 41.7% 16.7%
Beans 32.2% 48.3% 19.5% 52.9% 32.9% 14.3%
Sweet potato 30.0% 46.7% 23.3% 33.3% 55.6% 11.1%
aOnly major crops are listed in the table. The original data contain 683 and 577 crop cases for production decision
and output decision, respectively.
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The difference in crops alone, particularly cash or food crops, does not fully capture
realities of household decision-making. Because ‘traditional’ food crops are increasingly
commercialised because of rapid urbanisation, such crops are no longer ‘women’s’ crops.
Therefore, gendered patterns of decision-making over crops are not static. Hence, crops
were categorised into their different degrees of importance to household income, rated by
each household using a five band Likert scale (where 1 = of little importance; 2 = less
important; 3 = moderately important; 4 = important; and 5 = very important) in the
household survey section about crop management. Consequently, the level of
decision-making authority was found to differ in accordance with the importance of the crop
to household income (Figure 3). More specifically, results demonstrate that the husbands’
decision-making powers increase in accordance with the level of importance to household
income. Binary logistic regression analysis (Table 8) supports at a statistically significant
level the hypothesis that men’s decision-making power (on both crop management and
profit) increases with the level of importance of the crop to household income, while
Figure 3. Intra-household decision-making on crop management and profit in order of the level of
contribution to household income
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women’s decision-making power declines (on crop management). Moreover, the analysis
shows some statistical evidence that joint decision-making (on both crop management
and profit) decreases in accordance with the level of importance of the crop.
3.5 Empirical Evidence of Gendered Production Assets and Decision-Making
Power
3.5.1 Land
Decisions over innovation processes are determined by the gendered endowment and
allocation of production assets, as indicated in previously discussed in-depth interviews.
Many interviewees claimed that land ownership is one of the most crucial factors to affect
decision-making power with regard to innovations. Land ownership is clearly male
dominated at the research sites. The household survey found that 73.1 per cent of 238
households with spouses stated that their land belongs to the husband, 5.9 per cent claim
it belongs to the husband’s father, while only 15.5 per cent of the households said the land
belong to both husband and wife and 4.2 per cent to the wife alone. However, in-depth
interviews suggest that women have more decision-making power over innovations
implemented on the jointly owned land or on land rented solely by women. The trend of
land ownership has not changed drastically compared with the data of 10 years ago.
Nonetheless, the proportion of households with spouses who rent land increased from
26.8 per cent to 45.0 per cent over the last 10 years, although it is not clear who rented
the land, the wife or the husband.
Despite gender inequalities in land ownership, the noteworthy finding here is that
decision-making authority about innovations is affected by land ownership (Figure 4).
Because of the lack of more precise data on whose land each of the innovations is
undertaken, land ownership analysed here is the ownership of the household’s land in
general. Despite this data shortage, Figure 4 clearly reveals empirical evidence to show that
Figure 4. Relationship between intra-household decision-making over innovations and land
ownership
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joint decision-making on innovations is associated with the jointly owned land.
Furthermore, the wife’s autonomy in decision-making over her innovations is seen for
household land owned by the wife, while it is predominantly the husband who decides
on innovations if the household’s land belongs to him.
3.5.2 Capital inputs
The source of inputs strongly influences who makes decisions on the innovations and their
outputs, as noted by both male and female in-depth interview respondents. Figure 5, which
is based on the household survey, shows that the party who paid for the inputs to grow the
crops has a greater voice over the management of the crop and the profit generated.
3.5.3 Labour
A gendered division of labour is related to decision-making power over crop and profit
management. Figure 6 demonstrates the relationships between intra-household labour
contribution (work carried out by mainly men, women or jointly) and decision-making
pattern on management (decided by mainly men, women or jointly). It shows that each
farming activity has its own tendencies for labour allocation between men and women.
For instance, ploughing and planting are often carried out by both, while weeding,
harvesting and post-harvesting activity (e.g. peeling and drying) are carried out either by
women alone or by both. Spraying pesticides is typically carried out by men. These
gendered divisions of labour, clearly shown in Figure 6, were consistently reported by
farmers during in-depth interviews. Nevertheless, most importantly, who provides labour
at each stage of crop production and marketing is associated with the decision-making
power over management and profit, although the causality is uncertain. Figure 6 supports
the claims made in the in-depth interviewees that the party who contributed his or her own
labour has more say on innovation processes and outputs. It is noteworthy, however, that
women’s labour contribution appears greater than the men’s, despite their lower
decision-making power. The data seem to imply that women who mainly decide how to
grow the crop and control the profit are mostly working on the crop alone. The data
Figure 5. Intra-household decision-making on crop management and profit control and who paid
for inputs
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displayed in Figure 6 further captured the high rate of each farming activity jointly
performed, although it is clear that husbands have greater authority on decision-making,
even for crops for which the work is jointly carried out.
4 DISCUSSION
This study identified and explored factors which influence intra-household decision-
making authority which concerns innovation uptake and outputs from innovations. It used
a mixed method guided by the reasons that farmers perceived as influencing who has
decision-making authority. The study found a gender disparity with regard to
decision-making over both innovation uptake and benefits. On the one hand, married
women themselves decide whether or not to adopt approximately half of the innovations
with which they are directly involved, while the rest of their innovations are decided either
jointly or by their husbands. On the other hand, married men decide on the majority of their
innovation uptakes by themselves, while some of their innovations are decided jointly.
Moreover, the richer the households, the more male dominated the decision-making
process. Gendered enterprises (either food or cash crops and the importance of the crop
to household income) for which innovations are adopted, and the assets (land ownership,
labour participation and cash input contribution) used for those innovations, are found to
be the major factors influencing decision-making authority. Hence, intra-household
decision-making about innovations is greatly gendered because of norms, which stipulate
gendered roles and responsibilities, and to the gender inequalities associated with asset
endowment and control.
This study found that intra-household decision-making patterns on innovation uptake are
attributed to complex, intertwined reasons with a range of influencing factors. This tells us
that men and women have different levels of autonomy in deciding whether to adopt
Figure 6. Gender role division and intra-household decision-making on crop management and
profit control
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innovations and that this depends on the power relationship between husband and wife.
This, in turn, is determined by whether the required resources or assets can be mobilised
to undertake the innovations. It is crucial to emphasise, however, that gender inequality
in asset allocation causes unequal bargaining power, so that generally, the only bargaining
tool women have is their own labour. In addition, both social norms and individual
perceptions of gendered enterprise types (e.g. crop and livestock) and the gendered
division of labour play key roles (e.g. women’s responsibility for food provision) in
shaping decision-making patterns concerning innovations, which do not usually necessitate
‘explicit negotiations’ (Agarwal, 1997). Such norms are shared by both men and women at
community, household and individual levels. Women’s status as subordinate leads them to
acquiescing with regard to which innovations are adopted, and men’s superior position
results in underestimating women’s capacity and/or knowledge, which blocks
intra-household information flow from women to men.
Intra-household decision-making over innovation outputs follows a similar logic. Who
has more say about the outputs from innovations is strongly related to who contributed
to the enterprise in terms of assets, such as resources and labour. The common pattern is
that men control cash profit from marketing produce, especially when purchasing assets
such as land and cows, financing off-farm business and paying school fees for children,
while women decide how much produce is retained for family consumption and for
donating to neighbours or relatives. Women can negotiate over the harvest as long as the
outcomes are beneficial to the family food supply. For the purpose of buying basic home
groceries, such as soap, salt and cooking oil, women have more authority over spending
remuneration gained from their own casual labour and from part of the cash profit, as well
as profit earned from the little surplus of food crops grown primarily by them. Such crops,
socially perceived as ‘women’s crops’, include leafy vegetables and sweet banana. Again,
social norms and individual perceptions of gender roles (e.g. women as food providers) and
gendered crop types (e.g. food crops) greatly affect decision-making patterns in innovation
outputs. This reality demonstrates that the unitary model, and even Becker’s model of
‘benevolent dictators’, cannot fully explain this gender difference in decision-making
authority and intra-household decision-making dynamics, but the different varieties of
bargaining models clearly coexist, as many authors claim (Agarwal, 1997; Browning,
Chiappori & Lechene, 2010; Doss, 2013; Kebede, Tarazona, Munro & Verschoor, 2014;
Mcpeak & Doss, 2006; Moghadam et al., 2011; Njuki, Kaaria, Chamunorwa &
Chiuri, 2011; Udry, 1996; Wolf, 1990).
The methodology employed in this study allowed farmers’ voices to identify factors
influencing decision-making patterns and then confirmed the patterns using quantitative
data obtained by household and individual questionnaire surveys. The factors identified
were enterprise types (such as the types of crops and animals), land ownership, capital
input contribution and labour participation. The quantitative data in this study greatly
supported farmers’ claims. Firstly, whether crops are ‘women’s crops’ or ‘men’s crops’
determined decision-making authority over their management. The data verified that men
have greater decision-making authority and control of profits than women for all crops
and animals, but they have even greater authority for socially and culturally perceived
‘men’s crops’ or ‘men’s animals’ than ‘women’s crops’. Secondly, regardless of whether
crops are ‘women’s crops’ or ‘men’s crops’, the more the crops contribute to the household
income, the higher the rate of male dominance in decisions about how to grow the crops
and spend the profits. Thirdly, who provided the necessary assets (e.g. land, capital inputs
and labour) for producing the crops determines the degree of decision-making power.
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The first key finding, regarding farmers’ claims about ‘men’s crops’ or ‘women’s crops’,
evidence from analysis of crop management confirmed that men have greater
decision-making authority on what farmers recognise as ‘men’s crops’. However, what
determines ‘women’s crops’ and ‘men’s crops’ has not been fully addressed in much of
the literature, even though it supports the notion that men grow cash crops and women
grow food crops (Mazur & Onzere, 2009; Miiro, Chritchley, Van Der Wal &
Lwakuba, 2001; World Bank, 2007b), and this narrative is often oversimplified.
Doss (2002), who examined whether there are men’s crops and women’s crops in
Ghana, argues that most crops are grown both by men and women and cannot be simply
classified as either men’s crops or women’s crops, in spite of complicated gendered
patterns of crops grown on lands held by men or women and whether households are male
or female headed. Analysis of crop management in this study came to similar conclusions
as Doss (ibid.), that is, that all key household crops are grown both by men and women,
although men and women contribute their labour to different crops and to different degrees.
More importantly, as many farmers expressed, social norms and their personal beliefs
about what are ‘women’s crops’ and ‘men’s crops’ determine the gendered pattern of
decision-making authority over different crops. In other words, social norms and personal
beliefs not only dictate that food crops should be grown by women and cash crops by
men, but they also influence the use of profits from different crops for household
expenditure (World Bank, 2007b). The difference in bargaining power between men and
women does not always result from an explicit process of negotiation (Agarwal, 1997)
but from pre-established social norms of gendered crops and gendered responsibilities.
Nevertheless, the second key finding further shows that the higher the contribution of
particular crops to household income, the greater the degree of men’s decision-making
authority over management and expenditure. This finding is similar to that made by Njuki,
Kaaria, Chamunorwa and Chiuri (2011), who found that the higher mean income of a
commodity is characterised by a lower percentage income share with women in Malawi
and Uganda. This finding provides evidence of men’s capture of profits, even from food
crops, meaning that decision-making patterns are beyond a simple classification of
traditional ‘women’s crops’ and ‘men’s crops’.
The third key finding revealed that gender inequality in decision-making authority
concerning innovations is influenced by gender inequalities, which exist in asset ownership.
This finding is consistent with the work of a range of other authors (Agarwal, 1997;
Doss, 2013; Johnson et al., 2016; Meinzen-Dick et al., 2011; Quisumbing et al., 2015)
who claim that a significant determinant of intra-household bargaining power is asset
endowment and ownership, as well as the use and control of such assets defined by
institutions. The implicit rules binding decision-making authority over crop management
and innovations are that the party who contributes more input to grow the crops retains
higher bargaining power over the innovation process and outputs. These underlying rules
are often neglected in poverty reduction interventions. Clearly, men hold ownership of most
of the land in the research sites. In the meantime, men have greater capacity to mobilise the
labour of all household members, while female farmers mostly rely on labour provided by
their children during school holidays (Mazur & Onzere, 2009). Consequently, men’s higher
intra-household bargaining power over innovation outputs is exerted to further accumulate
men’s assets, which, in turn, provides greater bargaining power over new innovations. This
situation is similar to that which Agarwal (1997) describes as ‘iterative bargaining’,
whereby assets accumulated at one point of bargaining, which either strengthen or weaken
a person’s fall-back position, would affect the outcomes in the next round.
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Finally, this study unveiled different gendered patterns of bargaining power and
negotiation in the different wealth categories of households. Following Chant’s (2011)
criticism of the lack of attention paid to differences among women, there remains scarce
literature on intra-household decision-making which captures the heterogeneity of women.
Although beyond the scope of this article, there are large differences between those
households headed by single women (e.g. widowed, separated or divorced) and those of
women with partners in terms of decision-making authority in innovation processes.
Chant (2011) challenges the notion of the ‘feminization of poverty’ which regard female
household heads to be the most vulnerable of women; this study supports such a challenge
as it found that women in this position have much more freedom in innovation decisions
than has previously been reported. Even married women are not homogeneous. This study
analysed how the wealth status of the household influences intra-household decision-
making patterns. The key finding here is that the richer the household, the more dominant
male the decision-making authority over innovations, with fewer joint decisions being
made. While this finding may initially seem surprising, the reasons for it were clearly
evident from farmers. According to the poor and moderate farmers, women have to be
more involved in decision-making processes so that men can secure their wives’ labour.
For these wealth categories, plots are sometimes jointly purchased or rented by women
themselves, which encourages joint decision-making patterns and those which are less
male dominated. On the other hand, for richer men, who often have the capacity to hire
casual labour, their wives’ labour is less important to them, so women lack the bargaining
power that their less well-off counterparts gain through their labour. Thus, a person’s
bargaining power is defined by the person’s ‘fall-back position’, which is the outside
option in case of cooperation failure (Agarwal, 1997). This concept of a ‘fall-back
position’ helps understanding of why rich women expressed their fear of divorce.
The decision-making processes in terms of uptake and outputs of innovation in the
context of intra-household decision-making are highlighted in Figure 7. Deciding whether
or not to introduce innovations in the production domain is greatly affected by the
bargaining power of household individuals over the use of assets that are necessary for
Figure 7. Gendered intra-household innovation process. Source: Authors
Gendered Decision-Making in Innovation
© 2020 The Authors.
Journal of International Development published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd
J. Int. Dev. (2020)
DOI: 10.1002/jid
innovations, such as land, labour and agricultural inputs. Which innovations to be
introduced concerning which crops tend to be conditioned by social norms and individual
perceptions of gender roles and responsibilities? After uptake, a further intra-household
decision is made over how to allocate outputs for home consumption and sale and how
to spend the profit on consumption. This decision is based on the consumption preferences
shaped by social norms of gender roles and responsibilities, as well as how much assets
were contributed from which party in order to produce the output. The outputs are often
used to accumulate further assets, which influences further innovation uptake in an
‘iterative’ bargaining process. Thus, innovations may act as to change bargaining power
for intra-household asset allocation, either reproducing the existing male-dominant power
structure or empowering women.
5 CONCLUSION
Innovations are crucial for the development and adaptation of livelihoods of smallholder
farmers in SSA. At the same time, innovations have the potential to challenge conventional
gender norms and institutions and to reallocate assets within households (Quisumbing
et al., 2015), hence, ‘reordering of social relationships’ (Leeuwis & Aarts, 2011). By
unpacking farmers’ perceptions of gendered decision-making processes, this study has
demonstrated significant statistical associations between decision-making authority and
gendered enterprises, as well as gendered allocation of production assets, which are
supported by qualitative evidence. As shown in Figure 7, gendered assets determine
who controls innovation processes in both production and consumption domains, and this
reallocates assets within the household and results in either enhancing or challenging
cultural gender norms in the iterative processes. Therefore, this article suggests a broader
perspective is required to understand gender inequalities and innovation processes,
including bargaining power, which is greatly influenced by gender norms and asset
ownership and control.
This study challenges the unitary approach to bargaining power by analysing
intra-household dynamics. However, intra-household asset reallocation processes are
highly complex because both collective and cooperative bargaining models and
non-cooperative models coexist within the same household. It is clear from this study,
and from a number of other studies (Meinzen-Dick et al., 2011), that men have more assets
and, hence, more decision-making authority than women. Nonetheless, women have their
own spaces of opportunity for decision-making autonomy using their own labour and
available inputs. In addition, it is noteworthy that there is a high proportion of cases
whereby jointly purchased assets lead to joint decision-making. As some authors
(Chant, 2011; Doss, Meinzen-Dick, Quisumbing & Theis, 2018; Palacios-Lopez,
Christiaensen & Kilic, 2017) contest, it is important to scrutinise the validity of traditional
static gender narratives and attempt to comprehend a holistic picture of gendered situations
in the context of agricultural development.
Furthermore, a dichotomised approach which divides farmers into men and women is
not sufficient to fully understand the intra-household decision-making processes; certainly,
this study has proven that wealth also influences decision-making patterns. The study
found that key innovations reported by richer women are decided by their husbands to a
larger degree than for women in other wealth categories, while men’s innovations are
decided without involvement of their wives, especially in the case of rich men (Figure 2).
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Therefore, future policy and interventions in agriculture and rural development should
not simplistically adopt a unitary approach regarding a household as a minimum unit to
target; rather they should take into account intra-household communication and
decision-making processes in their innovation support as this greatly influences both
innovation processes and outcomes. Furthermore, it is crucial to recognise the risk of
overburdening women in a society, which defines women’s roles and responsibilities in
terms of food security. Added to this is the danger of imposing innovations that may widen
gender gaps in asset endowment and control, thereby weakening the women’s bargaining
power over new innovations and their benefits in the future. Innovation support should
encourage an increase in more gender equal stocks of, and economic returns from,
agricultural assets with a gender-transformative approach. Nevertheless, care must be
taken, as women tend to lose control of traditionally perceived food crops once they gain
higher market value. Studies are therefore needed to explore how potential changes, such
as commercialisation of food crops and expansion of the land rental market, affect
women’s freedom to make decisions on innovation processes and use of outputs. Such
studies may lead to better gender-sensitive and transformative policy and interventions.
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